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A number of constitutional provisions point in more than one direction.
This is true of  the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses,1 which enjoin both
establishment of religion and prohibitions on its free exercise; the Second
Amendment,2 which focuses on a collective interest in well-regulated militias as
well as individual rights to bear arms; and the Suspension Clause,3 which
protects the writ of habeas corpus even as it creates criteria for the writ’s
suspension.  Interpretation of such constitutional provisions might take the
form of radical subordination of one of the pair of competing themes, or,
alternatively, it might tend toward the ground that integrates and
accommodates these apparently divergent values.  What is surprising to behold
is how often legal scholarship on these subjects chooses the former route over
the more balanced, lawyer-like, and textually respectful approach of taking all
parts of the relevant provisions into account.
The articles in this symposium by Professors Randy Lee and Marci
Hamilton represent subtle illustrations of this phenomenon.4  Professor Lee
claims that the Clinton Administration’s concern for religious liberty and free
exercise values, as manifested in its position on partisan political activity by tax-
exempt religious organizations, is inadequate.5  Professor Hamilton, on the
other hand, claims that the Clinton Administration’s solicitude for free exercise
values, as revealed in a host of episodes she cites, is excessive and, hence,
insensitive to Establishment Clause values.6  These two efforts at critique of the
Clinton Administration bring to mind nothing so much as Goldilocks: Lee’s
porridge burns the tongue, and Hamilton’s chills the belly.  To make matters
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6. See generally Hamilton, supra note 4.
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worse, neither offers the crucial perspective of comparison of this
Administration with any of its predecessors.  A careful review of the overall
record suggests that the Clinton Administration has been more solicitous of the
Religion Clauses as a whole than can normally be expected of elected national
officials and their appointees.
II
Professor Lee’s article is singularly focused on the Clinton Administration’s
decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of the Branch Ministries Church.7  He
argues that religious entities may have a special religious mission to accomplish
in the political arena, by way of their capacity to “speak truth to power” and
thereby hold political leaders to standards of morality.8  He also argues that
conditioning tax exemption upon compliance with the rules limiting the
campaign activity of churches unconstitutionally burdens the churches’ religious
freedom.9
Professor Lee’s choice of target is peculiar.  First, he is aiming at the wrong
institution.  The rules about which he complains find their home in the Internal
Revenue Code10 enacted by Congress, and not in any particular policy decision
of the Clinton Administration.
Second, he attacks the Administration for bias in its enforcement of the
Code’s restriction because political appearances at churches by President
Clinton and others did not provoke the same sort of response from the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”) as did the anti-Clinton advertisement paid for by the
Branch Ministries Church.11  Bias correction in and of itself, however, would not
necessarily result in the empowerment of churches.  Whatever enforcement bias
may have been present, it could have been cured by enforcing the restriction
more widely rather than more narrowly.  If enforcement were broadened, the
complaint about administrative partisanship—permitting the churches
hospitable to a candidate for public office to have her in their pulpits, while
squelching those religious groups hostile to the candidate from attempting to
defeat her—would vanish, and the total sum of church participation in politics
would decrease.
Third, the claim that enforcement by the IRS of the restriction had been
motivated by political partisanship—that is, that the Administration had been
using the tax exemption rules in an attempt to silence its religiously motivated
political enemies—is heavily and clearly belied by the history of IRS
7. See Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp.2d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding
revocation of church’s tax exemption on grounds of violating restrictions on political campaigning by
tax-exempt organization).
8. Lee, supra note 4, at 408, 414-25.
9. See id. at 404-13.
10. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1999) (entities “organized and operated exclusively for . . . religious
purposes . . . which do not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements) any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office” are tax exempt).
11. See Lee, supra note 4, at 394-404.
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enforcement patterns, carefully recited by the district court in the Branch
Ministries decision.12  For many years, long predating the Clinton
Administration, the IRS had drawn a line between churches that invited
political candidates to their pulpits in the time leading up to Election Day, and
religious organizations that had employed their own tax-exempt resources to
reach out to those beyond their congregations with an explicit pro- or anti-
candidate message.13  The IRS had never enforced the prohibition on partisan
political activity against those religious entities that invited candidates to speak
to congregations, even in those cases in which electronic media foreseeably
would cover and transmit to the general public both the candidate’s message
and the religious setting in which it had been uttered.14  Indeed, the Branch
Ministries opinion reports a total of sixty-five occasions, concerning candidate
visits to religious institutions, upon which the agency had taken no action.15
Among the political visitors enumerated were some quite prominent
incumbents and challengers of both major parties, including Bill Clinton, Newt
Gingrich, Jesse Jackson, and Oliver North.16
By contrast, the IRS had a consistent policy of enforcement in cases in
which religious  organizations engaged in outreach to non-adherents with the
express purpose of urging the election or defeat of a particular candidate.17  The
district court took the highly unusual step of permitting discovery into the
enforcement practices of the IRS,18 yet the Branch Ministries Church could
come up with absolutely nothing that suggested the Clinton Administration or
any of its predecessors had administered these rules in a spirit of political
partisanship, or had interpreted them overbroadly so as to squelch political
involvement by religious institutions.  If anything, the record suggested
significant underenforcement—whether out of respect for religious institutions,
concern for the sensitivity of such enforcement efforts, or a consensus between
the major political parties that it was in both of their interests to allow fairly
liberal church participation in political campaigns.
Fourth, the particular speech that led to trouble for the Branch Ministries
Church is hardly a good example of the unique voice of religious institutions.
Although the advertisement (appended to Professor Lee’s paper) led with the
admonition to Christians to “beware,” followed by a warning that Christians
should “not put the economy ahead of the Ten Commandments,” the
particulars of the advertisement were couched in terms suggestive of the work
of spinmeisters of the Republican National Committee rather than a careful
attempt at developing religious truth.  The anti-Clinton charges in the ad




16. See id. at 21.
17. See id. (citing two cases in which IRS revoked tax exemptions of religious organizations for
similar conduct).
18. See id. at 17-18.
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included an assertion that then-Governor Clinton “[s]upport[ed] abortion on
demand” and “[s]upport[ed] the homosexual lifestyle, and want[ed]
homosexuals to have special rights.”  Abortion on demand has long been a right
wing code for government-subsidized abortion and abortion for minor females
without parental notice or consent.  The “homosexual lifestyle” is a
purposefully ambiguous term for both homosexuality per se and a charge of
promiscuous homosexuality with which cultural conservatives have  stereotyped
gay men.  The leaders of the Branch Ministries Church surely have a right to
hold and express these views, but their claim to be able to do so with tax-
exempt contributions, while their political opponents must use after-tax dollars
to fight back, is considerably less persuasive when one notes that the message is
slur and slogan rather than a good faith effort at Biblical exegesis.19
Professor Lee’s assertion that the governmental interest in this context is to
maintain the voice of faith in this society is lovely in its Brennan-esque
inversion of government and individual interests,20 but it misses entirely the
point of the restriction on partisan political activity by all tax-exempt charitable
institutions.  Whatever special treatment religious organizations may be able to
claim in other contexts,21 the area of political activity is one in which the claim to
the constitutional uniqueness of religion is unusually weak, and the claim to
equal participation by all is unusually strong.22  A policy of permitting churches,
but not other tax-exempt organizations, to use tax-deductible contributions to
help elect candidates to government offices positively contradicts Establishment
Clause values, as the Supreme Court has elaborated them in cases like Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.23
Professor Lee’s discussion of the Branch Ministries litigation does suggest a
noteworthy observation about religion in the Clinton Administration, though it
does not seem to be the point he has in mind.  Contrary to Professor Hamilton’s
insinuations that the Clintonites are all too friendly to the religion-favoring
19. In very small print, the ad makes reference to Biblical verses in connection with each of its anti-
Clinton assertions.  While some of the verses are on point, others seem only remotely connected with
the political charges made.  The ad cites, for example, Exodus 20:14 (“You shall not commit adultery”),
in support of its condemnation of homosexuals.  See Lee, supra note 4, at 437 (reprinting Branch
Ministries advertisement).
20. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Brennan, J., for the Court, asserting that the state,
as well as welfare recipients, has an interest in the very pre-termination hearings the state wishes to
deny to recipients).
21. Claims of constitutional uniqueness on the part of religious organizations are ordinarily limited
to “internal” matters of church property and personnel.  See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (church property); EEOC v. Catholic
University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (1996) (personnel).  See generally Carl H. Esbeck, The
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998); Kent
Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Church Property, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1843 (1998).
22. A long line of Supreme Court decisions confirms the constitutional significance of equal access
to avenues of political input.  See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(invalidating poll tax in state elections); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (one person, one vote
rule in legislative apportionment).
23. 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that the Establishment Clause forbids Texas from exempting
religious materials sold by religious organizations from state sales tax).
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dictates of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”),24
Professor Lee’s account of the Justice Department’s litigating positions reveals
how the executive branch’s day-to-day operations tend to undercut the pro-
religion political rhetoric of which the President seems so fond.
When the President signed RFRA in 1993, he did so with great fanfare and
enthusiasm.25  Soon after the signing, Professor Michael Paulsen quite
appropriately suggested that the actual operations of the Department of Justice
and other federal agencies might be less religion-sensitive than the Act seemed
to require, especially as reinforced by the President’s support for it.26  A few
years later, research I conducted after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of
Boerne v. Flores27 strenuously supported the notion that federal and state
governments were essentially ignoring the Act or attempting to gut it by urging
courts to adopt narrow interpretations.28
The government’s briefing of the Branch Ministries case in the district court
is nicely  illustrative of this tendency.  In order to come under the Act, which
the church argued required a religion-focused adjustment in the political
advocacy restriction of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the
Church had to demonstrate that the Code “substantially burden[ed]”29 its
religious practice.  Its argument for so claiming was quite straightforward: The
Code required the church to choose between tax-exempt status and what it
claimed to be religiously motivated political advocacy.30  In light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sherbert v. Verner31—a decision that RFRA explicitly
purported to “restore”32—such conditioning of a government benefit upon
surrender of the right to engage in religiously motivated conduct should have
presented an indisputable case for a “substantial burden” under RFRA.33
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).  The Supreme Court invalidated the Act as applied to the states.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
25. See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1993, at A18.
26. See Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56
MONT. L. REV. 249, 249-50 (1995).
27. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
28. See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 588-97 (1998)
(documenting lack of administrative implementation of RFRA, and judicial narrowing of the Act by
interpretation).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
30. See Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp.2d 21, 26 (D.D.C. 1999).
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the state had imposed an unconstitutional burden when it
denied unemployment benefits to an employee who refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of
her faith).
32. 42 U.S.C § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
33. Even with such a burden conceded, the government had the powerful argument remaining that
it always has a compelling interest for denying religion-based exemptions from the tax code.  See
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).  The district court accepted this argument.  See Branch
Ministries, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 25.  Of course, Congress had not exempted the tax code from the operation
of RFRA, so this sort of blanket no-exemption policy was in some considerable respect inconsistent
with the RFRA mechanism, which requires case-by-case exploration of religious versus governmental
interests at stake in each conflict.  Moreover, exemptions from restrictions on non-profit status do not
necessarily raise the same concerns as exemptions from obligations to pay tax.
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Nevertheless, in its papers filed in the district court, the government strenuously
controverted the argument that section 501(c)(3) burdened the religiously
motivated conduct of the church.34  The government never mentioned Sherbert,
or this case’s resemblance to it, or Congress’s stated intention to restore
Sherbert’s status as good law.  Instead, the government sloughed off the
church’s argument as resting upon a tax-exempt’s “operations” rather than
belief.35  Operations are a synonym for practices, and Sherbert itself involved a
religious believer’s practice of adherence to the behavioral requirements of
Saturday Sabbatarianism.  Moreover, in both Sherbert and Branch Ministries,
the relevant practices appeared to be religiously motivated.
In the Branch Ministries litigation, the government’s back-of-the-hand
treatment of RFRA most likely had no effect on the outcome.  The district
court was clearly and correctly disposed to find that the government had a
compelling interest in eliminating political advantage for tax-exempt
organizations.  Nevertheless, the government’s litigating posture was designed
to minimize the force of the RFRA arguments.  What the government did in
this case is no doubt replicated with great frequency whenever the government
is faced with a RFRA claim.  In this regard, at least, Professor Lee has
reminded us of a pattern of a day-to-day insensitivity of the executive branch to
particular claims of religious institutions, perhaps explicable in terms of the gap
between bureaucratic practice below and political values at the top.
III
This demonstration of the unreceptivity of the government’s litigators to the
claims of religion is in stark contrast with Professor Hamilton’s extended
indictment of the Clinton Administration’s asserted overfriendliness toward
religious institutions.36  Because she is so much more attentive to what the
Administration says for public consumption than what it does in the trenches,
she charges that the Clinton Administration lopsidedly favors the values of free
exercise over the values of nonestablishment.37  In support of this thesis, she
heaps together examples of pro-religious behavior without differentiating
among them on constitutional grounds, mixes enthusiastic support by the
Administration for certain policies together with the phenomenon of the
Administration being dragged by Congress into measures the President tended
to oppose, and ignores the Clinton Administration’s weak record of
administrative implementation of RFRA, which the President so
34. See Reply Brief for the Defendant in Further Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment
or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can
Be Granted at 12, Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Richardson, 970 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1997) (No.
CIV.A.1:95CV00724-PLF).
35. See id. at 14-15.
36. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 364-71.
37. See id. at 360-61.
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enthusiastically signed.38  Indeed, the contrast between the Lee and Hamilton
critiques highlights a basic question about the relationship among the
President’s political rhetoric, legislative agenda, and administrative
performance in evaluation of the “record” of any presidential administration.
Professor Hamilton’s critique of the Clinton Administration concerns its
political behavior, not its legal or administrative practices, and behind her
attack lies a theory about the appropriate relationship between religion and
politics.  Her view is that religious factions, and, in particular, broad coalitions
within which religious factions congregate, are a danger to the Republic, and
that Presidents labor under some sort of a quasi-constitutional obligation to
resist the entreaties of such groups.39
Professor Hamilton characterizes her view as Madisonian, but the label fits
somewhat uncomfortably with Madison’s views.  Madison was indeed
concerned with the problem of faction in general, and religious faction in
particular.40  Madison, however, was careful to distinguish among the causes of
faction in which he included the divergence among human interests and the
political liberty to pursue them,41 and the possible effects of faction in which he
included the possibility of majority tyranny or private capture of public
institutions.42  Because he believed normatively in political and religious liberty,
and empirically in the divergence among human interests, he concluded that all
attempts to restrict the cause of faction were foolhardy and tyrannical.  Instead,
he contended that the constitution must be structured to control the effects of
faction.  Hence, he argued that a large commercial republic, with a multitude of
factions and a corresponding “multiplicity of [religious] sects,” was the key to
solving the problem of factions. 43  To this he added legislative bicameralism and
separation of powers in the federal government as additional checks on the
ability of factions to use the levers of government to further private ends.44  In
his own presidency, moreover, Madison distinguished between government
support of churches as institutions, which he disfavored, and government
support of religious faith and its ideals, which he occasionally was willing to
support.45
Whether the political and intellectual lineage associated with Professor
38. See generally id. at 372-89.
39. See id. at 360-64.
40. The most famous exposition of these views is The Federalist No. 10.  See THE FEDERALIST NO.
10, at 77-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).  For a full development of Madison’s views
on religious faction, see Christopher Eisgruber, Madison’s Wager: Religious Liberty in the
Constitutional Order, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 347 (1995).  Larry Kramer has recently shown that scholars in
the 20th century paid far more attention to Madison’s theory than did Madison’s contemporaries.  See
Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 611 (1999).
41. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 40, at 78.
42. See id. at 80-84.
43. Id. No. 51, at 324 (James Madison).
44. See id. at 320-25.
45. See Donald Drakeman, Religion and the Republic: James Madison and the First Amendment, 25
J. CHURCH & ST. 427, 427-29 (1983).
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Hamilton’s surname has subconsciously influenced her we cannot know, but her
view of Madisonianism seems to me quite un-Madisonian.  She misses the very
point of Madison’s reliance on structural checks when she criticizes the
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion and President Clinton for his
receptivity to the Coalition’s agenda, which includes supporting religious liberty
legislation and other political initiatives designed to involve political branches
in promoting religious freedom.  Nothing in Madisonian political theory justifies
the attack on the Coalition; it is simply an association of factions, some from the
civil liberties community and others from faith-based groups with a set of
political aims.  Surely this group deserves the same political liberty as other
factions, and coalitions among factions, to pursue its ends.  As Professor
Hamilton recognizes, the fracturing of the coalition over issues pertaining to
proposed religious liberty legislation is itself evidence to support Madison’s
belief that no permanent majority party or interest could sustain itself over
time. 46  That the ACLU and the Christian Legal Society can sometimes join
forces and sometimes be directly opposed is a lovely illustration of the theory of
shifting minority factions.
Moreover, nothing in Madisonian political theory imposes a duty upon the
President to resist the entreaties of any particular faction, religious or
otherwise.  The structural checks upon which Madison relied were completely
independent of the behavior of any particular President or faction which
appealed to him.  Even a President hell-bent on unconstitutionally establishing
religion will still need the concurrence of Congress and the cooperation of the
courts.  Not even Professor Hamilton accuses President Clinton of such anti-
constitutional designs, and, in any event, the courts disrupted RFRA, the
boldest pro-religion scheme to which he was a party.47
Neither the existence of a particular faction, nor a pattern of presidential
receptivity to it, is condemnable per se.  If the Coalition for Free Exercise had
existed in 1939, and had pleaded with then-President Roosevelt to take special
efforts to help save European  Jewry from Nazi persecution, surely we would
not condemn the Coalition or the President if he responded sympathetically to
its pleas.  Presumably, it was the first “coalition for the free exercise of religion”
that brought the Free Exercise Clause into being. Professor Hamilton’s
complaints about the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, and President
Clinton’s  positive response to it, thus can only sensibly rest on the substantive
contents of their mutual agenda.
Here, one must proceed item-by-item, although I recognize that the
thematic flavor of the whole package may exceed the sum of its parts.  When
Professor Hamilton’s examples are unpacked and examined, the picture that
emerges is definitely one of an Administration somewhat partial, as a political
46. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 370-71.
47. They did so first by a set of narrowing interpretations, see Lupu, supra note 28, at 594-97, and,
ultimately, by invalidation of RFRA as applied to the states, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
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matter, to the values of religious liberty, but not overtly or deeply hostile to the
institutional concerns of the Establishment Clause—for example, dangerous
alliances between government and powerful churches, and government
espousal of sectarian creeds.  In this comment, I cannot remark upon each and
every one of Professor Hamilton’s illustrations, but I do want to call attention
to some particular features of her examples-in-chief.
A.  Executive Branch Actions
Some of the Clinton Administration’s joint ventures with the Coalition have
been focused on clarifying the law that governs situations of conflict between
private religious expression and other competing interests. The most
noteworthy of these efforts produced the Guidelines on Religious Expression in
the Public Schools.48  These guidelines, which have no legal force, but which
nevertheless attempt to channel the judgment of school administrators and
those who might adjudicate disputes over religion in public schools, are
exquisitely sensitive to the Establishment Clause problem of officially
sponsored religious speech in public schools, and the Free Exercise problems
presented by student-initiated religious speech in the same setting.49  Although
the Administration may well have promulgated the guidelines primarily for
political credit, the guidelines may help forestall or resolve highly charged
disputes over religious matters.  To the extent the executive branch imprimatur
on the guidelines facilitates these functions, this is a public service,50 not an
unconstitutional intrusion into the field of religion.  Indeed, the government at
some level is inevitably involved in these disputes, and attempts at a set of
principled and politically palatable resolutions are surely preferable to the
demagoguery and litigation that often occur when local school boards take the
lead.
As an occasion for the exertion of executive power, the Clinton
Administration’s guidelines on religious speech in the public workplace51 are
even more defensible than the school guidelines; after all, the President is
responsible for the conduct of that workplace.  And here too, though one can
always quibble about the particulars, conflicts between workers who desire to
engage in their own religious speech at work and workers who prefer not to
hear such speech require focused attention and reasonable rules to guide their
resolution.
Of course, one can always ask why religiously motivated speech deserves to
be singled out or to receive arguably more favorable treatment than sexually
oriented speech or other controversial, non-work-related speech in the
48. Secretary’s Statement on Religious Expression (visited Apr. 17, 2000) (Secretary Richard W.
Riley) <http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion.html>.
49. These problems will be aired in the Supreme Court this term in Doe v. Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist.,
168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 494 (1999) (granting certiorari as to the validity of
student-led prayer at high school football game).
50. Professor Hamilton’s paper concedes this point, see Hamilton, supra note 4, at 387.
51. See 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1245 (Aug. 14, 1997).
LUPU_FMT.DOC 11/14/00  10:47 AM
448 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: Nos. 1 & 2
workplace.52   Reasonable people can differ over whether religious themes are
preferable to sexual themes for workplace chatter, but from the perspective of
the captive but discomfited listener, the distinction will not hold.  Moreover, the
express permission in the guidelines for an employee-led prayer at weekly staff
meetings, so long as the prayer is not reasonably perceived as state
endorsement of religion,53 seems to go too far; a prayer in such settings, like an
official prayer at school, is inherently coercive and no part of appropriate
government business.
Without question, if the Establishment Clause generally forbids treating
religion as a category of activity entitled to special attention by government,
both the school guidelines and the workplace guidelines are eyebrow-raising.
But if the core of Establishment Clause concerns are government actions that
enhance institutional power of sectarian entities compared to others, or involve
the state in sectarian advocacy, then guidelines of this sort seem a considerably
lesser evil.  At most, they empower religious individuals, to the limited
detriment of those who do not share their beliefs or who think it inappropriate
to express them in the workplace, without similarly empowering religious
organizations.54  Viewed in their most troubling light, these guidelines recreate
the inevitable tension between free exercise and nonestablishment, and resolve
it with a tilt in the free exercise direction in the government workplace, and the
nonestablishment direction in schools.  This pair of offsetting biases seems quite
consistent with the background law,55 and, though perhaps misguided, not a
cause for the sort of constitutional alarms that Professor Hamilton has set off.
B.  The Supreme Court
Professor Hamilton identifies three cases in the Supreme Court in which,
she claims, the Administration has been insensitive to nonestablishment
concerns.  One of these, City of Boerne v. Flores,56 she knows very well because
she successfully argued on behalf of the City against the constitutionality of
RFRA as applied to the states.  But the main ground of the argument in Boerne
was not the Establishment Clause.  Rather, the dispute’s center of gravity was
the federalism-based question of the scope of congressional power to expand
the scope of constitutional rights under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment.57  Indeed, Professor Hamilton’s opening line in the Supreme
52. The guidelines identify religious speech as deserving of treatment at least as good as, if not
better than, speech on other subjects.  See id.
53. See id.
54. The distinction between empowering individuals in their religious pursuits, and similarly
empowering religious organizations, is one which the Supreme Court took seriously in Rosenberger v.
Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S..819, 834-36 (1995).
55. Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (invalidating official prayers in public
schools) with Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983) (upholding prayer at opening of state
legislative session).
56. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
57. Although all parties fully briefed the Establishment Clause questions, only Justice Stevens
indicated a view on them; he would have held RFRA to be a violation of that Clause, and hence
LUPU_FMT.DOC 11/14/00  10:47 AM
Page 439: Winter/Spring 2000] RELIGION CLAUSES 449
Court, as I recall it, was “This case is not about religious liberty; it is about the
scope of federal power.”  She succeeded in persuading the Court that the case
was precisely about that.  Although it is true that the United States argued that
the Establishment Clause did not bar RFRA, this contention under current law
is surely plausible.58  Right or wrong, such a government stance is hardly a mark
of Establishment Clause insensitivity.  
The other two cases mentioned by Professor Hamilton both involve federal
aid programs that include sectarian schools among their beneficiaries.  The
Administration defended both programs.  In Agostini v. Felton,59 which involved
public employees providing remedial instruction on-site in sectarian schools
(among others),60 the Administration successfully argued for the overruling of
Aguilar v. Felton.61  Here, too, the Administration did not adhere to the
separationist party line, but took the entirely reasonable position that the aid
program neutrally aided all children in low-income neighborhoods, and did so
in a way that created virtually no risk of diversion of resources to religious
instruction.  Aguilar was a holdover from the regime of separationism in the
extreme on issues of educational subsidies, and I cannot fault the
Administration either for wanting this sort of aid to reach all low-income
children or for believing that moving the program off-site to satisfy the
Constitution was a needless waste of resources in exchange for little of
constitutional value.
This term, in Mitchell v. Helms,62 the Administration has defended the
constitutionality of a separate federal program that involves lending, among
other things, books and computers  to schools, public and private, sectarian and
otherwise.  Here, the contrast between the Administration’s position and that of
the private intervenors also defending the program is stark and illuminating.
The intervenors argued that government may aid all schools, including sectarian
ones, so long as the program is religion-neutral and the government itself is not
engaged in religious indoctrination.63  By this theory, diversion of aid to
religious uses by the school or its personnel—here, computers offer the most
obvious possibility—does not implicate the Constitution, though it would in this
unconstitutional as applied to the federal government as well.  See id. at 536-37 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
58. The case that best supports the government’s position is Corporation of Presiding Bishops v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1987) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit Congress
from relieving religious organizations alone of otherwise generally applicable duties to not discriminate
on the basis of religion).  In my view, the Establishment Clause questions presented by RFRA are close
and difficult.  See Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 590-92 (1999).
59. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
60. See id. at 208.
61. 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that the Establishment Clause prohibited New York from sending
public school teachers into parochial schools to provide secular, remedial education for disadvantaged
children).
62. See Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub. nom Mitchell v. Helms, 119
S.Ct. 2336 (1999).
63. See Brief for Petitioners at 17-27, Mitchell (No. 98-1648).
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case violate the governing statute and regulations.  By contrast, the United
States argued in Mitchell that the statute’s restrictions, which include anti-
diversion policies and a requirement that the aid not replace the school’s own
financial efforts, are necessary to rescue it from constitutional condemnation.64
Once again, separationists will disagree with the government’s position, but,
without question, it is narrowly drawn, sensitive to Establishment Clause
concerns, and a great constitutional distance from the “pure neutrality”
approach advanced by the intervenors and, more generally, by supporters of
school voucher programs.
C.  The Congress
Professor Hamilton offers a number of examples in which the Clinton
Administration supported, or at least did not veto, congressional acts that
favored religion. There is a difference, however, between enthusiastic support
and refusal to veto.  With respect to RFRA, Clinton indeed signed the bill with
enthusiasm.65  But it had been introduced in the Bush Administration, and the
work of pushing it had always fallen to the Coalition for Free Exercise and the
bill’s congressional sponsors.  There is no sign that the Administration supports
the current proposals for a Religious Liberty Protection Act66 designed to fill
most of the gaps left after the Boerne decision.  The Clinton Administration in
practice has done little to promote or institutionalize the requirements of
RFRA, which still applies to the federal government.  The federal agencies
rarely show cognizance of it,67 and, as suggested in my comments on Professor
Lee’s paper, federal government lawyers are not particularly solicitous of
RFRA arguments.
The International Religious Freedom Act68 is a different story.  Here, I
cannot disclose my sources, but I have heard from a number of people in
position to know—both within and without the government—that the
Administration did not favor the Act, and worked quietly to defeat or dilute it.
Why would any administration, after all, want imposed upon its foreign policy
machinery the following burdens: (1) a set of required sanctions against other
nations that offend principles of religious liberty,69 (2) a designated office within
the State Department with a single issue mandate and constituency,70 and (3) an
outside watchdog group looking over the Department’s shoulder in its
64. See Brief for the Secretary of Education at 31-37, Mitchell (No. 98-1648).
65. See Steinfels, supra note 25, at A18.
66. See H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
67. See Lupu, supra note 28, at 589 (noting the paucity of references in the Federal Register to
RFRA between 1993 and 1997).  A follow-up search of the Federal Register, which I performed in
1999, produced no evidence of increased agency attention to RFRA.
68. 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (1999).
69. See id. §§ 6441-42 (specifying presidential actions required in response to violations of religious
freedom).
70. See id. § 6411 (creating within the Department of State the position of Ambassador at Large
for Religious Freedom).
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implementation of the Act’s policies?71  All of these mechanisms reduce the
diplomatic flexibility that would otherwise obtain with respect to the U.S.
response to religious persecutions by other nations.  That the Clinton
Administration acceded to these arrangements does bespeak the popularity of
religious freedom as a principle of the lex Americana we would like to impose
on the world, but does not suggest the Administration itself is willing to make
religious freedom its number one priority in foreign relations.  One need look
no further than our long-standing policies toward China for evidence that
religious liberty for all the world does not drive this Administration’s diplomatic
stance.
D.  The Zeitgeist
Professor Hamilton is no doubt correct when she claims that President
Clinton is openly religious in his personal life and in some of his political
commitments.  This personal religiosity, which may indeed be completely
authentic, distinguishes him from his Republican predecessors Bush and
Reagan, though of course it does not separate him from Jimmy Carter.  She is
also correct that the President does not openly admit that religion may be a
force for evil as well as for good.  Whether this is cognitive dissonance, good
politics, or both, only the President and the nonexistent presidential psychiatrist
might know.
However, with respect to one aspect of the Clintonian religious zeitgeist,
Hamilton criticizes where, I think, only credit is due.  She describes the
President’s view of religion as aimed at “unity” or “ecumenicism.”72  This seems
right on the money and, when compared to many of his predecessors,
completely admirable.  Richard Nixon was a nasty anti-Semite, and Ronald
Reagan used religion, particularly in relation to abortion, as a divisive wedge in
politics.  To the extent Bill Clinton has fully embraced the idea of religious
tolerance in an increasingly diverse America, and has simultaneously opposed
the religious coercion that would have been spawned by the Istook
Amendment,73 he has been a force for good.
As Professor Marshall amply demonstrates in his piece in this issue, Stephen
Carter vastly overstated the case in The Culture of Disbelief when he remarked
that religion has been marginalized in the United States.74  Nevertheless,
Professor Carter did identify the cultural chasm that separates secularists from
people of deep religious faith in America.75  Presidential administrations, far
more than the courts or Congress, can reshape the political culture with
71. See id. §§ 6431-32 (creating the Commission on International Religious Freedom).
72. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 364-65.
73. See William P. Marshall, The Culture of Belief and the Politics of Religion, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 453, 464-65 (Winter/Spring 2000).
74. Id. at 457-61 (critiquing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993)).
75. Id. at 461-64 (explaining why religious people may perceive their views as marginalized in
contemporary America).
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constant, thematic reinforcement of certain attitudes and concerns.  Policies
enacted during the Clinton years have not always been sympathetic to the cause
of liberty, as critics of his criminal justice and immigration policies have
frequently pointed out.76  This should come as no surprise; the Bill of Rights is
designed to be an impediment to political majorities, and, as Michael Dukakis
learned the hard way, Presidents are rarely lined up with the program of the
ACLU.  But this President, far beyond the record of his predecessors in this
century, has been unusually supportive of the values of the Free Exercise
Clause, and has sustained this effort without trampling the values of the
Establishment Clause in the process.  Paying substantive attention to both
Religion Clauses, and threading so delicate a course between them, constitutes
a pair of executive branch achievements worthy of commendation.
76. See, e.g., David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on
Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1998); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle,
Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997).
